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YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, SECOND EDITION, 2010.
Adam Hayes*
Regardless of one's opinion on the necessity of international armed
conflict, most would agree that it has a definite presence within current
international affairs and human rights discussions. As battle stories from
various nations make their way to the front page of the newspapers each
week in vivid detail, average civilians are brought further into the dialogue,
becoming more aware of war's apparent chaos. However, while most civil-
ians are very aware of the existence of war and its atrocities, most probably
are not aware of the extent to which international laws and treaties govern
all aspects of international armed conflict, attempting to create order out of
the virtual disorder. It is within this context that Professor Yoran Dinstein's
second edition of The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International
Armed Conflict enters the stage, playing an invaluable role in educating
legal professionals, soldiers and even ordinary civilians about this ever pre-
sent aspect of humanity.
Within the first chapter, Dinstein makes it clear that the law of in-
ternational armed conflict (LOIAC) is a branch of international law quite
different from any other, mainly because it codifies "incalculable infrac-
tions and abuses [that] can be perpetrated by an extraordinary number of
persons . . . ."I These persons are not limited to combatants, but include
civilians as well, making it incredibly important that "every combatant -
and as many civilians as possible - [ ] be familiarized with these norms."2
However, few resources that cover this branch of law in a simplified but
academically stimulating way exist as a foundation for training the every-
man. Thankfully, this book's modest size and concise structure form an
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1 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 30 (Cambridge University Press, 2d ed. 2010).
2 Id.
208 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 17
exceptionally valuable resource that could be that starting point for the
training Dinstein envisions.
Human rights activists and humanitarians, however, should be fore-
warned that a flowery, idealistic discussion of the theories governing inter-
national armed conflict are not to be found within the pages of this book,
but neither are the aggressively profound rants of a warmongering aca-
demic. Instead, Dinstein walks a very objective line, a balancing act that
reflects LOIAC's own balancing act. While LOIAC may reflect humanity's
desire for less carnage in wartime, Dinstein notes that it must also "march
in lockstep with the compelling demands of reality." 3
Dinstein makes it known in the very beginning that violence is "a
vital ingredient of hostilities . . . ."4 While we desire a "relief from the
tribulations of war," he writes, we must do so "bearing in mind that war is
fought to be won."5 From this cold reminder set forth within a beautifully
outlined "general framework," Dinstein leads the reader through more than
fifty cases and over 100 years of treaties regarding international armed con-
flict, as well as the human rights, environmental, and cultural aspects of
war. Issues as broad and deceptively simple-sounding as "proportionality,"
or as specific as the proper occasion for destroying cultural property, are
explored in intricate detail within the confines of fact, never sparing the
reader from the multi-faceted realities of war.
A particularly interesting concept that Dinstein puts forth, one cru-
cial to understanding many parts of LOIAC, is the notion that on occasions
when LOIAC is called international humanitarian law (IHL), it is wrong to
assume it encompasses human rights.6 Dinstein emphasizes that "human
rights" cover only the protection of rights given to individual humans, while
"humanitarian law" concerns the general mitigation of "human suffering"
during wartime.7 Furthermore, while "LOIAC (or IHL) contains norms pro-
tecting human rights, many . . . are granted exclusively to states and not to
individual human beings."8 Despite the existence of numerous treaties that
expressly fill in this possible gap by guaranteeing human rights to individu-
als, the subtext seems to be that the consideration of individual human
rights is taken for granted as ever present in the background, and not neces-
sarily a consideration involved in the formation of these laws.
3 Id. at 297.
4 Id. at 1.
5 Id. at 5.
6 Id. at 19.
7 Id. at 19-20.
8 Id. at 20.
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Dinstein's discussion on "belligerent reprisals" illuminates an ex-
ample of a lawful hostile act that may directly manifest human rights con-
siderations. A belligerent reprisal is when B attacks A after A had attacked
B in a way breaching customary LOIAC. The law, however, allows B to
launch this reprisal proportional to the breach committed by A, but B is
required to cease once A has ceased its own breach of LOIAC. 9 This con-
cept is heavily complicated if A's initiatory breach of LOIAC involves
human rights violations, and Dinstein concedes that the "eye for an eye"
rule "paramount" to deterring breaches of LOIAC 0 is "utterly alien to the
contemporary law of human rights."" Even if A kills prisoners of war from
B's state, B is not allowed to then kill prisoners of war from A's state in
reprisal. As Dinstein explains, "[t]he LOIAC-induced human right of a law-
ful combatant to the protection of his life when captured by the enemy
cannot be denied only because the [b]elligerant [p]arty in whose armed
forces he serves has acted in breach of LOIAC."l 2 Nevertheless, while indi-
vidual human rights may not be violated, B still has options for reprisal.
Dinstein believes that when A causes massive death among B's civilian
population, B should not be prevented from launching a massive reprisal
upon A's civilian objects - especially government buildings.13 To Dinstein,
LOAIC's requirement that B spare civilian objects is premised on the "un-
reasonable expectation that . . . State B would turn the other cheek to State
A."' 4 This expectation, the professor laments, "sounds more like an exercise
in theology than in the laws of war."' 5
In addition to protecting innocent civilians, Dinstein also highlights
LOIAC's terms for the preservation of innocent cultural property. Within
chapter six's section exploring the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protec-
tion of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,16 cultural property
is therein defined as "movable or immovable property of great importance
to the cultural heritage of every people," and is protected from attack along
with the "buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve the
movable cultural property . .. ."7 However, Dinstein explains that this pro-
9 Id. at 254.
1o Id.
I Id. at 259.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 260.
'5 Id.
16 Id. at 174.
'7 Id. (quoting Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict art. 1(a), May 14, 1954).
2011 209
210 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 17
tection is not absolute and can be evaded under the right circumstances, a
reflection of the delicate balancing act LOIAC performs as it tries to take in
cultural considerations with the reality that war is fought to be won. To
reduce complication for the reader, Dinstein uses an example pulled from
an event during the Gulf War where the United States decided not to attack
enemy fighter aircraft positioned next to the ruins of the ancient temple of
Ur.'8 In making its decision, the United States balanced military interests
and cultural interests, and found that the latter outweighed the first.'9 How-
ever, Dinstein asserts that had there been an "operational runway within
reach," the United States could have attacked the aircraft in full disregard of
any possible damage it would cause to the cultural property nearby.20 This
illustration is but one of the many Dinstein peppers throughout the book in
an easy-to-understand fashion to articulate the complexity of LOIAC.
Despite the overall quality and craft of this book, there is a small
issue worth addressing. If this book is, as its preface states, to be used as a
reference "not only for international lawyers, but also as a tool for the in-
struction of military officers," 21 and perhaps even for ordinary citizens not
trained in the language of law, there is one small addition Dinstein might
consider making in his next edition: a small glossary of French and Latin
legal terms. Although the authoritative material cited by Dinstein uses ter-
minology of law, it sometimes includes phrases in French and Latin that a
wider audience may neither recognize nor be accustomed to. The author has
already included a table of cases and treaties, an index of persons and sub-
jects, and a list of abbreviations for the reader's convenience; thus, adding a
glossary would not detract from the academic quality, but further enhance
an already well-structured reference. While the average law professional
may not need to refer to such a glossary, it would arguably make an already
concise reference of complicated material that much more accessible for the
lay reader lacking familiarity with such terms.
In barely 300 pages, Dinstein manages to outline, summarize and
lightly analyze the wealth of law governing international armed conflict,
pulling not only from primary sources of statutory and case law, but offer-
ing valuable interpretation and commentary. The wealth of material covered
in this book seems daunting at times, but Dinstein's organization and expla-
nation helps guide the reader with ease while subtly challenging him with
stimulating academic substance.
18 Id. at 176.
'9 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at xiii.
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As law students, we are taught to think through issues logically,
seek out arguments in favor of both sides, scale over our ideals and personal
opinions, and quell our emotions. Perhaps no branch of law represents this
goal of objectivity more clearly than the law of war, and Yoram Dinstein
has honored this tradition well in writing this book. While it would be in-
credibly easy to trail off on idealistic tangents concerning warfare and inter-
national law, Dinstein crafts subtle yet blunt critiques, encouraging the
reader to truly consider the implications of a given rule. Undoubtedly, Din-
stein has created an outline for discussion on the past, present, and future of
LOIAC - a discussion that is important for, and can be understood by, the
very soldiers and citizens this area of law affects.

